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One  of the most  mysterious  phenomena  in  science  is  the  nature  of  conscious  experience.  Due  to its  sub-
jective  nature,  a reductionist  approach  is having  a hard  time  in addressing  some  fundamental  questions
about  consciousness.  These  questions  are  squarely  and  quantitatively  tackled  by  a recently  developed  the-
oretical  framework,  called  integrated  information  theory  (IIT)  of  consciousness.  In  particular,  IIT  proposes
that  a maximally  irreducible  conceptual  structure  (MICS)  is  identical  to conscious  experience.  However,
there  has  been  no principled  way  to assess  the claimed  identity.  Here,  we  propose  to apply  a mathemati-
cal  formalism,  category  theory,  to  assess  the  proposed  identity  and  suggest  that  it is important  to  consider
if  there  exists  a proper  translation  between  the  domain  of  conscious  experience  and  that  of  the  MICS. If
such translation  exists,  we postulate  that  questions  in  one  domain  can  be answered  in  the  other  domain;ategory theory
ntegrated information theory
henomenology
quivalence
very  difﬁcult  questions  in the  domain  of  consciousness  can  be  resolved  in  the  domain  of mathematics.
We  claim  that  it is  possible  to empirically  test  if such  a functor  exists,  by  using  a combination  of neuro-
scientiﬁc  and  computational  approaches.  Our  general,  principled  and  empirical  framework  allows  us  to
assess  the  relationship  between  the  domain  of consciousness  and  the  domain  of mathematical  structures,
including  those  suggested  by IIT.
ublis© 2015  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
The material basis of subjective conscious phenomena remains
ne of the most difﬁcult scientiﬁc questions (Chalmers, 1996).
hile it is impossible to doubt if the reader is consciously awake
as opposed to unconscious as in deep dreamless sleep) and visually
onscious of this text at this moment (as opposed to blind and see-
ng nothing), it appears very difﬁcult to be completely certain about
onscious states of other persons, seems more difﬁcult to infer con-
ciousness in babies or animals, and looks even impossible to tell if
rtiﬁcial machines can ever achieve human-like consciousness.
Over the last 25 years, concerted neuroscientiﬁc approaches
ave established that consciousness arises from the interactions
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among some neurons in the thalamo-cortical systems (Boly et al.,
2013; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koch, 2004). Now the ﬁeld
has matured enough to result in a speciﬁc theory, called integrated
information theory (IIT) of consciousness (Oizumi et al., 2014;
Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2015). IIT has strong explanatory power
in many observed neuroscientiﬁc enigmatic facts about conscious-
ness and proposes a precise mathematical formalism that should
be identical to consciousness.
However, it has been unclear whether there exists any princi-
pled and empirical ways to assess the proposed identity. And, it
seems unclear what it means for some mathematical formalism
and consciousness to be identical.
To address these issues, here, we  propose that a fundamen-
tal mathematical formalism, called category theory can be a very
powerful tool. In category theory, a category is deﬁned as a collec-
tion of objects and arrows.4 In its standard usage, a category refers
4 Mathematically speaking, a category C consists of (1) a collection of objects,
such as X and (2) a collection of arrows, which deﬁne relationship between any
pair  of objects, such as X and Y, such that (3) for every object X there is a self-
referential arrow 1x: X→X, (4) any pair of arrows, such as f: X→Y and g: Y→Z, are
article under the CC BY license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
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Fig. 1. Category theory. (A) Three objects in geometry and those in algebra can be
mapped between them by preserving their structural relationships. This mapping is
called a functor in category theory. (B) In category theory, quality of similarity can be
precisely deﬁned with graded levels. Existence of a functor is relatively weak, requir-
ing relatively loose conditions. Yet, existence of a functor is already quite powerful
to  the extent that it can guarantee the translation of proof of the Brower’s theorem
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Fetween geometry and algebra. We  conjecture that the domain of mathematical
tructures and the domain of consciousness or qualia can be shown to be similar up
o  “categorically equivalent”.
o a class of things that share certain properties, as in categories
f objects, humans and animals. The standard deﬁnition of cate-
ory is consistent with, but less fundamental and abstract than, the
eﬁnition of category in category theory.
This formalization of categories allows us to compare and relate
wo seemingly complete separate domains of knowledge, such as
athematical concepts and conscious experience. In the following,
e ﬁrst introduce category theory and then brieﬂy review the two
o-be linked worlds of consciousness and mathematical structures
ccording to IIT. Next we outline what strategies need to be taken
or this research program. Finally, we offer the future prospects,
romising the dissolution of Hard problem.
. Category theory
Category theory was introduced in 1945 by mathematicians
ilenberg and Mac  Lane (Awodey, 2010; Mac  Lane, 1998). Category
heory is now considered as the foundation of mathematics, a posi-
ion previously held by set theory. In category theory, everything
s considered as either an object or an arrow that connects objects.
bjects and arrows can include almost any concept. In Fig. 1A, we
onsider three objects in geometry (a disk, a ring and a double-ring)
nd three objects in algebra (a set that is composed of only zero
0}, a set of integer {Z}, and a set of 2 integers {Z2}). Interestingly,
hen we relate these objects in each domain5 of mathematics, their
elationships can be proven to be mathematically analogous.  More
recisely, category theory says that there exists a functor between
hem. A functor is a structure-preserving map  between categories.6We  focus on two important properties of category theory. First,
ategory theory provides a mathematical framework for translating
 relationship in one domain to a distinct and separate domain by
omposable, that is, gf:  X→Z, (5) a self-referential arrow is both a left and right unit
or composition, that is, if f: X→Y, then f1x = f = 1yf, and (6) composition is associative,
hat is, (hg)f = h(gf).
5 Throughout this paper, we use “domain” to mean a slightly different concept in
domain” in mathematics. Our usage is more colloquial, referring to a set of highly
elated objects, concepts and phenomena.
6 Mathematically speaking, it means that (1) any object m in M has a mapped
bject q in Q, that is, F(m) = q, (2) any arrow f in M has a mapped arrow g in Q, that
s,  F(f) = g, (3) F preserves identities, that is, for any object X in C, F(1x)=1(F(X)) and
4)  F preserves composition, that is, for any pair of arrows f: X→Y and g: Y→X in C,
(gf)  = F(g)F(f). Research 107 (2016) 1–7
use of a structure-preserving map, or a functor. Second, category
theory brings a precise mathematical formalism to assess whether
or not two  separate domains of knowledge are similar and in what
qualitative way  they are similar.
As to the ﬁrst point, we  brieﬂy describe a powerful example of a
mathematical proof. In geometry, there is a fundamental theorem
due to Brouwer (Fulton, 1995). This theorem, known as Brouwer’s
ﬁxed-point theorem, is notoriously difﬁcult to prove within the
domain of geometry. Brieﬂy, this theorem states that any contin-
uous function that maps any point on a disk to another point on
the same disk leaves at least a single point that does not change its
position. For example, any rotation about the center of a disk would
leave the position of the center of the rotation unchanged. While
difﬁcult to prove within the domain of geometry, by translating
geometric objects over to the algebraic domain, it can be seen that
the proof of this theory amounts to a proof that there is no isomor-
phic mapping from {0} into a set of integers, which is rather easy to
prove. Today, many mathematicians go from one domain to another
in order to prove theorems. In fact, a similar method has been
used to prove Fermat’s last theorem. Outside of the ﬁeld of math-
ematics, category theory has bridged across different disciplines.
Recent work, for example, have shown the analogy in the precise
sense among quantum mechanics, topology, logic and computation
(Baez and Stay, 2009), which can be used as a basis to translate the
proofs in one domain to the others. Application of category the-
ory into neuroscience and cognitive science has recently emerged
(Ehresmann and Gomez-Ramirez, 2015; Phillips and Wilson, 2010).
As to the second point, category theory offers extremely use-
ful tools to characterize similarity between the different domains.
In category theory, the nature of similarity is precisely deﬁned
as different degrees of the structure-preservation through math-
ematical terms; requiring more and more conditions amounts to
strong similarity. In this framework, the qualitative strength of
similarity degrades from “identical”, “categorically isomorphic”,
“categorically equivalent”, “existence of adjunction” to “existence
of functor”. With these graded scales of similarity, we  can precisely
understand in what sense IIT’s proposed mathematical struc-
tures and conscious experience are similar. Though it is weakest
among the above list, “existence of functor” is sufﬁcient to prove
Brouwer’s theorem mentioned above. We  believe that ﬁnding
a functor between IIT’s mathematical structure and conscious-
ness might be also sufﬁcient to bring about many theoretical
and empirical results, without requiring “identity” as claimed
by the original theory. Before the invention of category theory,
there was  no systematic framework to characterize this kind of
qualitatively graded levels of similarity (Mac  Lane, 1998). From a
category-theoretic point of view, strength of similarity, analogy,
metaphor, and relationship that are used in many different scien-
tiﬁc disciplines can be qualitatively characterized in a very precise
manner. It might sound totally counter to some readers to see
a claim such as a very “precise” and “qualitative” characteriza-
tion, but this is indeed the core and general feature of category
theory.
It is these two properties of category theory that are likely
to be useful in considering the so-called “mind-body” problem
which regards the nature of mapping between consciousness and
brain. Decades of neuroscientiﬁc research have culminated to a
suggestion that it is not the brain per se, but rather some type of
mathematical structure that maps to the domain of consciousness
(Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2004). While we focus on a particular
mathematical structure, called a maximally irreducible conceptual
structure (MICS) in the integrated information theory (IIT), our
argument generalizes to any mathematical structures that can be
derived from the brain.In the next section, we  explain what we mean by consciousness
and mathematical structure, which are to be linked by a functor.
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subset of the neurons in the brain, and the particular quale that a
subject of the brain is experiencing.
7 In IIT 3.0 (Oizumi et al., 2014), the integrated information of a given sub-
mechanism is the minimum between the integrated information for the past and
the  future. In the exemplar case, it is important to realize that the current state of
C  = 0 completely determines the future state of B(AND) = 0. Thus, even when A andN. Tsuchiya et al. / Neuros
. Qualia and mathematical structure as the two  domains
o be linked by category theory
.1. Consciousness and qualia
In neuroscience, consciousness usually refers to either level or
ontents of consciousness (Boly et al., 2013). Level ranges from
ery high in the aroused awake state to low as in coma, vegeta-
ive states, deep dreamless sleep, and deep general anesthesia. At a
iven level of consciousness, every experiential moment contains
arious contents of consciousness. Contents of consciousness are
ynonymous with the other concepts such as qualia (its singular
s a quale) (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009; Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012)
r phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2005). A sense of self or self-
wareness is considered as one type of contents of consciousness.
o avoid the ambiguity, we use the term qualia from now on. Qualia
an mean different concepts depending on whether they are used
n the broad- or narrow-sense. A quale in the broad sense refers to a
ingle moment of whole experience, composed of various contents,
rom various sensory modalities. A quale in the narrow sense refers
o a speciﬁc aspect of one moment of experience. Two  different
ualia in the broad sense induced by two situations, such as seeing
 red circle on the left or on the right, can be considered as inducing
he same quale in the narrow sense, such as seeing a particular red
ircle regardless of its spatial locations (Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012).
.2. A maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) in
ntegrated information theory (IIT)
Integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness is a recently
eveloped theoretical framework (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi,
004). IIT provides a mathematical formalism, called a maximally
rreducible conceptual structure (MICS) (Oizumi et al., 2014), which
s claimed to be “identical” to experience or qualia in the broad
ense. According to IIT, a system generates consciousness as long as
t generates non-zero integrated information. The MICS is the math-
matical formalism that fully describes how the components of the
ystem causally and irreducibly contribute to the whole system.
he exact way to compute the MICS is not central to our argument
ere, but the interested reader can refer to (Oizumi et al., 2014).
ere, we brieﬂy explain the essence of the IIT and the MICS, which
re relevant to our discussion on how to assess the claimed identity
ith category theory.
IIT starts from identifying ﬁve essential properties of con-
ciousness as follows (Tononi, 2015). (1) Intrinsic existence: we
xperience consciousness only from our own intrinsic perspec-
ive, and our own consciousness exists independent of external
bservers. (2) Composition: consciousness is structured; a moment
f experience, or a quale in the broad-sense, is always composed
f various aspects of experience, or qualia in the narrow-sense.
3) Information: one moment of consciousness is highly informa-
ive because it excludes all other possible experiences that one can
ave at that moment. In other words, any single experience greatly
educes uncertainty about its own state. (4) Integration: conscious-
ess is always integrated and experienced as a united whole. We
annot experience two  independent consciousnesses at the same
ime. When a brain is split into two, consciousness also splits into
wo (Gazzaniga, 2005). (5) Exclusion: consciousness is composed
f a particular set of qualia in the narrow sense and it ﬂows at a
articular spatial and temporal scale. We  cannot experience with
ore contents than we normally have, such as qualia in the broad-ense that includes ultrasound, or less contents, such as qualia in
he broad-sense that lacks color. We  cannot also experience slower
r faster ﬂow of the time than we have. All possible experiences
ther than what we have are excluded. Research 107 (2016) 1–7 3
From these ﬁve phenomenological axioms, IIT proposes ﬁve cor-
responding postulates, which can possibly support the identiﬁed
phenomenological properties. To explain how the postulates lead
to the MICS, consider Fig. 2. Fig. 2A depicts all four possible states
(1–4) of a system of two units, where each unit can be either “on” or
“off”. If each unit copies the state of the other with a time delay (),
knowing the present state of the system completely determines
its past state; if the present state is “off-on” (Fig. 2B, right), the
past state (Fig. 2B, left) has to be “on-off”, removing uncertainty
about the past. If the present state is unknown, uncertainty of the
past state is maximal; the four states of this system (i.e., on-on, off-
off, on-off, or off-on) are equally likely. By quantifying uncertainty
using a concept of entropy, H = log2(the number of possible states),
we can deﬁne the reduction of uncertainty with mutual information
as I = H − H*, where I is the mutual information, H* represents con-
ditional entropy, or how much uncertainty about the past remains
given the present state. This formulation of mutual information is
intrinsic because it concerns only the system’s own  state and does
not relate to anything outside (extrinsic to) the system. Integrated
information (˚) is the difference between the information derived
from the whole system (I) compared with the sum of the informa-
tion arising from its parts (I*):  ˚ = I − I*. In the above example, if
the system is partitioned into two parts (Fig. 2C), each part cannot
specify its past state even if its present state is known, thus I* = 0,
and  ˚ = 2. Thus,  ˚ quantiﬁes how much information is lost if the
whole system is cut into its constituent parts. Importantly,  ˚ can be
exhaustively computed for any subsets in the system. For a system
of three units, A, B, and C (Fig. 2D),  ˚ is deﬁned within any combi-
nation of mechanisms (called sub-mechanisms), including A, B, C,
AB, AC, BC as well as ABC.
Now consider a system composed of logic gate A (OR), B (AND),
and C (XOR) in a state, where A is on and B and C are off, (Fig. 2E,
a ﬁgure panel taken from Figure 15 in Oizumi et al., 2014). With a
procedure in Oizumi et al. (2014) that is substantially more sophis-
ticated than the one we sketched above, we  can examine how
each sub-mechanisms uniquely speciﬁes and constrains possible
states of the system in the past and the future. A subset of sub-
mechanisms that irreducibly specify the system’s past and future
are called concepts in IIT (Oizumi et al., 2014). In Fig. 2E, a concept
is depicted as a star in the 8-dimensional space (projected into 3
dimensions); the 8 dimensions correspond to 8 states of the sys-
tem (000, 001, 110, etc.), separately for the past and the future. In
this case, AC does not generate any concept because it does not inte-
grate any information (i.e., ˚AC = 0) for the future state of any of the
7 possible sub-mechanisms (A, B, C, AB, BC, AC, and ABC), above and
beyond A and C separately.7 Thus, a maximally irreducible concep-
tual structure (MICS) for this system in this state is a constellation
of 6 concepts in the 16-dimensional space (Fig. 2E).
Importantly, IIT claims that a quale in the broad-sense is identical
to a MICS, generated by a particular subset of the neural system, for
example, a thalamo-cortical system excluding cerebellum. In other
words, IIT proposes a mapping between a certain mathematical
structure, which is derived from connectivity and a state of a certainC  are jointly considered, there is no new information about the future states of any
possible sub-mechanisms, above and beyond what A and C are independently con-
sidered. Therefore, ˚AC = 0 in the future. Accordingly, there is no star both in the
past and the future for AC in Fig. 2e. For more details, refer to page 5–16 and Figure
1–16 of Oizumi et al. (2014).
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Fig. 2. IIT and the MICS in a nutshell. (a) A system composed of 2 units, each of which is either on (white) or off (black) and copies the state of the other with a delay of
tau.  It has 4 possible states, indicated by the numbers 1–4 below. Uncertainty of the state is called entropy: H = log2(4) = 2. (b) If the present state (at time t) of the system
X(t)  is “on-off”, it completely speciﬁes its past state at t −  as “off-on”, removing all uncertainty (H* = log2(1) = 0). The reduction of uncertainty can be quantiﬁed as mutual
information: I = H − H* = 2. (c) If each unit is considered separately, each part cannot specify its past state (I* = 0). How much information is lost when the whole system (I) is
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(Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009; Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012). Can cate-
gory theory consider any qualia we experience as objects or arrows?
Some qualia in the narrow sense are straightforward to considerut  into its constituent parts (I*) is integrated information:  ˚ = I − I* = 2. (d) All poss
ll  the interactions in the system. (e) For system ABC (inset), a maximally irreducib
o  IIT (Oizumi et al., 2014). Each star is a concept, which is irreducible to its constitu
It is important to note that this paper is neutral with respect to
he particular approach taken by IIT (e.g., from phenomenological
xioms to postulates, actual steps to compute a MICS) although we
o believe that IIT is the most promising approaches at the moment.
ur arguments here are general enough to hold to any kind of pro-
osed mapping between the domain of qualia and the domain of
athematical structures, such as the MICS, derived from the con-
ectivity and activity states of the brain, which has been proposed
o far or which can be proposed sometime in the future.
To make the theory testable, with some assumptions and
pproximation, it is now possible to compute an approximated
ersion of the MICS from empirical neuronal recordings, such as
lectrocorticogram (ECoG) directly recorded from the surface of the
rain of awake human epilepsy patients (Haun et al., 2014; Oizumi
t al., 2016).
. Three steps that are required for the category theory
pproach to consciousness
Our conjecture about qualia, the MICS and their relationship is
hat (1) the domain of the MICS is a category, (2) the domain of
ualia is a category, and (3) there exists a functor which relates the
wo domains. Next, we consider if these conjectures would be valid
r not.
.1. Can the domain of the MICS be considered as a category?
Given that any mathematical concept can be interpreted in the
ramework of category theory, we see no problem in interpreting
he MICS or an approximated MICS as a category.
The MICS in IIT is a complex web of interactions between sub-
echanisms in a system and the whole system (Fig. 2E). Thisbsets of a system (here, composed of unit A, B, and C), determines composition of
ceptual structure (MICS) can be derived as in the right side of the panel, according
arts.
structure essentially captures all possible causal interactions in the
system, starting from those between two  elements, through among
more than three elements, to among populations of elements.8
Such a hierarchy of causal interactions is the one that is reﬂected
in the MICS or its approximation.
In this domain, it is also possible to deﬁne similarity using various
types of metrics. The metrics would include quantitative distance
metrics, such as Euclidean distance, Kullback–Leibler divergence,
and Earth Mover’s Distance, or more topological and qualitative
metrics, such as inclusion and overlap. Various qualitatively differ-
ent concepts of similarity in category theory (Fig. 1B) can be also
used to characterize the similarity of mappings within the domain
of the MICS.
4.2. Can the domain of qualia be considered as a category?
The question of whether or not the domain of qualia in the
narrow- and/or broad-sense can be considered as a category turns
out not straightforward to answer. While we  believe there are no
fundamental problems in regarding the domain of qualia in the
narrow and/or broad sense as a category, we  need more research
to address this question.
In the narrow sense, a quale refers to a particular content of con-
sciousness, which can be compared or characterized as a particular
aspect of one moment of experience or a quale in the broad sense8 In the brain, the fundamental elements are likely to be either a neuron or a
population of neurons.
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and the MICS are not related by a functor from the MICS to qualia,
because it did not preserve categorical structure: essentially the
same MICS are corresponding to essentially different qualia.
approximated versions may  be meaningfully compared above the level of existence
of  a functor in a useful way.
11N. Tsuchiya et al. / Neuros
s objects: a quale for a particular object or its particular aspect,
uch as color. There are, however, some aspects of experience that
re apparently difﬁcult to consider as objects. For example, we  can
xperience a distance between the two cups, which is a relation-
hip between the objects but itself has no physical object form.
uch abstract conscious perception can be naturally regarded as
 relationship between objects: an arrow. Further, there are some
ypes of qualia that seem to emerge out of many parts, such as a
ace. A whole face is perceived as something more than a collection
f its constituent parts; there is something special about a whole
ace. Psychological and neuroscientiﬁc studies of faces point to con-
gural processing, that is, a web of spatial relationship among the
onstituent parts of a face is critical in perception of a whole face
Maurer et al., 2002). In category theory, a complicated object, like
 quale for a face, can be considered as an object that contains many
rrows. Considered this way, any quale in the narrow sense can be
onsidered as either an object, an arrow, or an object or arrow that
ontains any combinations of them.
In the broad sense, a quale refers to a moment of experience,
ncluding all the sensory modalities and all the experiential aspects.
t is rather straightforward to consider any moment of experience
s a web of objects and arrows that are consciously experienced.
These ideas in category theory are consistent with the anal-
ses of one’s own experience, called phenomenology, founded by
dmund Husserl. In particular, phenomenology considers objects
s correlates of structural movements of phenomena (so called
constitutions”) (Husserl, 1999).9 Such movements can be regarded
s arrows. We  anticipate that the more reﬁned analysis incorpo-
ating phenomenological methods will be able to characterize the
omain of qualia as a category.
.3. Is there a functor between the two domains?
If we are convinced that (1) the MICS and (2) qualia are both cat-
gories, then the remaining job is to mathematically prove if there
xists a functor between the two categories. A functor is a map-
ing between two categories. Importantly, a functor has to preserve
tructural relationships or arrows among objects in each category.
et us consider a functor F: M→Q  (or Q→M)  between two domains
ICS (M) and qualia (Q). Here, we can consider arrows that signify
imilar. Any mapping F that preserves similarity relations denoted
y arrows among the objects will qualify as a functor. As noted
bove, category theory is extremely ﬂexible, thus, deﬁnitions of
bjects and arrows, as well as a functor can be ﬂexibly deﬁned to
erve for a particular purpose. Here, we just provided one exem-
lar set of categories and a functor between them. Examination of
ossible categories and functors can be a fruitful research project.
Distinct two domains, such as those of qualia and the MICS, are
nlikely to be “identical” according to the deﬁnition of “identical”
n category theory. In category theory, “identical” is an extremely
trong concept, requiring the two categories to be “exactly the
ame” in almost all aspects that can be examined. “Categorically
somorphic” is also very strong. More natural conjecture is that
he two domains can be related up to “categorically equivalent” or
existence of adjunction”. “Existence of a functor” is a much weaker
evel of “similarity”, yet it is already quite powerful as mentioned in
he ﬁrst section.10 We  believe that there will be massive progress
9 While the Husserlian approach is nothing to do with IIT’s quantitative derivation
f  the conceptual structure per se, we believe that Husserlian phenomenological
nalyses may  be able to reﬁne IIT’s “phenomenological axioms” (see Section 3.2).
he phenomenological methods can examine if the proposed ﬁve axioms are indeed
elf-evident and if any alternative sets of phenomenological axioms are possible.
his can be a fruitful future project.
10 In fact, almost all other levels of similarities would be necessary only when
ne tries to compare two mathematical categories. For example, the MICS and its Research 107 (2016) 1–7 5
in understanding the relationship between qualia and the MICS, if
we can ﬁnd a functor between the two  domains.
In the domains of both qualia and the MICS, it is easy to consider
several elementary relationships or bidirectional arrows, such as
different or similar.  Any two visual experiences, for example, have
a kind of obvious mutual similarity, in that they are both visual
while they are obviously different from any auditory experiences.
Likewise, any aspect of experience or a whole experience is either
similar to or different from other experiences. These bidirectional
arrows, indicating similarities or differences, can characterize any
relationships between two  arrows in the qualia domain. We  expect
the same can be said about any two arrows within the MICS domain.
The question is, then, if there is a functor that preserves all these
relationships between the two domains.
5. Empirical research programs for ﬁnding a functor
between the categories of qualia and the MICS
Is there any empirical way to ﬁnd a functor? We  believe that a
combination of the approximation of the MICS and the neurosci-
entiﬁc approach of consciousness, called the neural correlates of
consciousness (NCC), can in principle test whether or not a pro-
posed mapping between the qualia and the approximated version
of the MICS can be considered as a functor.11
5.1. Same stimuli, different qualia
One of the most powerful approaches in the NCC is to utilize
visual illusions that generate distinct neural states and distinct con-
scious experiences, despite an identical physical input. Some of
the most popular techniques include binocular rivalry (Blake and
Logothetis, 2002) and backward masking (Breitmeyer and Ogmen,
2007). In this approach, ﬁrst we  need to construct an approximated
MICS based on neuronal recordings, which can be consisted of activ-
ity of many single units or many local ﬁeld potentials, representing
a population of neurons. There already exists approximated ver-
sions of integrated information (Oizumi et al., 2016) that can be
applied to electrocorticogram (ECoG) recordings (Haun et al., 2014).
For example, in the “MICS” column of Fig. 3, we show two hypo-
thetical approximated MICS based on a set of 4 channels of ECoG
recordings (channel A, B, C and D: indicated as 4 red points in the
“brain” column of Fig. 3).12 Next, we  quantify and test if the differ-
ent qualia, such as seeing a red dot or not (Fig. 3 left), maps onto two
different MICS.13 If the two MICS turn out to be identical, reﬂecting
the identical physical stimulus input, we  can conclude that qualiaFinding a functor between the MICS and its approximation is a separate math-
ematical project, but it is likely to be easier one to solve.
12 For each of all 6 pairs (e.g., AB, BC) we obtain the approximated integrated
information (see Fig. 2A–C, Oizumi et al., 2016). The magnitude of the integrated
information for each pair is represented as the y coordinate of each red dot (Fig. 3
“MICS”). For each pair (e.g., AB), we  can add another channel to form two trios
of  channels (e.g., ABC and ABD), which are represented as two dark blue dots and
connected from the red dot. Finally, we have a quartet of channels ABCD, whose inte-
grated information value is indicated by the y coordinate of the pale blue dot. The x
position of the each dot is the same between the two MICS, but assigned arbitrary
for visualization purpose. Importantly, for each different visual stimulus, we can
obtain neural responses from a set of electrodes, from which we can construct the
approximated MICS empirically. For the detailed procedure, see Haun et al. (2014).
13 For reﬁned analyses, it would help to have visibility ratings in each trial to
characterize the phenomenology in more details (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004).
6 N. Tsuchiya et al. / Neuroscience Research 107 (2016) 1–7
Fig. 3. NCC experiments, combined with the approximation of the MICS, can assess if qualia and the MICS are related by a functor. When a powerful illusion such as general
ﬂash  suppression (Wilke et al., 2003) is presented to subjects, they may  or may  not see the red dot on a trial-by-trial basis. An approximated version of the MICS can be
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tonstructed based on activity of a population of neurons, whose activity is strongly c
f  a proposed mapping qualiﬁes as a functor. If it is a functor, it has to preserve all 
imilar MICS with two very similar qualia as well as two different MICS with two d
.2. Different stimuli, same qualia
Similarly, we can also adopt using noise techniques or
ore elaborate “perceptual metamer” techniques (Freeman and
imoncelli, 2011). Here, we present two physically different images
o subjects. However, resulting qualia are the same. In this case,
he MICS should be the same regardless of the difference in physi-
al stimuli. If so, we can conclude that the MICS and qualia are not
elated by a functor from Qualia to the MICS, because it did not pre-
erve categorical structure: the same qualia are corresponding to
ssentially different MICS.
.3. Qualia and the MICS in rewired animals?
We  can also consider changing the brain’s connections to see
f qualia and the MICS change in parallel. One powerful test can
e rewiring experiments in ferrets as performed by Muriganka Sur
nd colleagues (von Melchner et al., 2000; Sharma et al., 2000). In
his research, they manipulated the anatomical connections of the
errets’ visual and auditory system, such that visual input from the
yes reached to the auditory cortex. Importantly, they made this
anipulation throughout the development in only one side of the
rain. In the other intact side of the brain, these ferrets received
isual information at the visual cortex and auditory information
t the auditory cortex. After development and successful training
f discrimination between visual and auditory modalities using
he intact side of their brain (i.e. teaching the ferrets to behav-
orally distinguish between seeing and hearing), the ferrets were
onfronted with visual information that reached only the rewired
uditory cortex. Even though the visual information was processed
n the rewired auditory cortex, the ferrets responded that they
aw (von Melchner et al., 2000). This suggests that qualia gener-
ted in the intact visual cortex were likely to be similar to qualia
enerated in the rewired auditory cortex, and in turn that these
ualia were quite different from qualia generated in the intact audi-
ory cortex. Though we cannot directly ask qualia the ferrets had,
his interpretation is reasonable based on similar situations aris-
ng in human subjects who were trained with sensory substitution
evices (Bach-y-Rita, 2004; Bach-y-Rita et al., 1969). Given that
ocal neural connectivity in the rewired auditory cortex became
uch similar to the visual cortex (Sharma et al., 2000), it is likely
hat the MICS generated from rewired auditory cortex became moreted with contents of consciousness. With the approximated MICS, we can now test
ural relationships in each domain. In other words, a functor would relate two very
t qualia.
similar to the MICS generated from the intact visual cortex than the
MICS generated from the intact auditory cortex.
In these exercises, it will be possible to reﬁne computational
methodology to approximate the MICS, the brain regions to record
neural activity, what types of stimuli and paradigms to use, and so
on. This approach is consistent with the ongoing research projects
that try to identify the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), and
it extends its potential toward identifying the domain of the math-
ematical structures that have equivalent structures as the domain
of qualia.
6. What are the consequences of ﬁnding a functor between
qualia and the MICS?
What can we learn if we  can ﬁnd a functor between qualia
and the MICS? As we showed an example in Introduction, one of
the most powerful applications of category theory is to provide
a deﬁnitive answer to a question that cannot be easily addressed
in one domain by translating the question by a functor to the
other domain, where the translated question can be much easier
to address.
We proposed the three steps to apply the category theory
approach in consciousness studies. First, we  need to characterize
our own phenomenological experience with detailed and struc-
tured descriptions to the extent to accept the domain of qualia as
a category. Second, we need to develop and reﬁne ways to con-
struct mathematical structures, such as the MICS from IIT, that are
strongly constrained by the known neuronal facts about conscious-
ness. The approximated versions of the MICS are most promising
in this regard. Third, we  should test if there exists a functor that
preserves the structures of both qualia and the MICS. Once this is
achieved, we can analyze the mathematical structures of a system,
whose qualia are unknown (e.g., babies, bats, insects, plants or arti-
ﬁcial systems), and translate it into the qualia domain. This is the
procedure that we  propose to solve extremely difﬁcult questions
in the qualia domain.
These questions are actually expected to be answerable if IIT can
be validated (Tononi and Koch, 2015). Employing concepts of cate-
gory theory, this paper aimed to contribute to provide a principled
and mathematically rigorous way to assess the similarity of the two
categories (Mac  Lane, 1998), that is, the domain of our conscious
cience
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xperience and the domain of any proposed mathematical struc-
ures, including the MICS in IIT. Although we focused on the MICS in
IT in this article, our argument is highly general and do not need to
e restricted to the MICS in IIT. Further, our framework also allows
s to assess and quantify the quality of analogy between qualia
nd any approximated version of the MICS, facilitating empirical
esearch projects along this line.
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